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Abstract: 
This article tests the hypothesis that the opportunistic manipulation of financial accounts 
by mayors increases their chances of re-election. Working with a large and detailed 
dataset comprising all Portuguese mainland municipalities, which covers the municipal 
elections that took place from 1979 to 2001, we clearly show that increases in 
investment expenditures and changes in the composition of spending favouring highly 
visible items are associated with higher vote percentages for incumbent mayors seeking 
re-election. Our results also indicate that the political payoff to opportunistic spending 
increased after democracy became well-established in the country. 
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1. Introduction 
 The objective of the present article is to determine whether opportunistic mayors 
can increase their chances of re-election by generating political business cycles around 
elections. We test the hypothesis that pre-electoral increases in municipal expenditures 
and changes in their composition, favouring items most visible to or preferred by the 
electorate, are associated with higher vote percentages for the incumbent mayor. 
Research is conducted over a dataset comprising all the Portuguese mainland 
municipalities, from 1979 to 2001. 
In previous work, Veiga and Veiga (2004c) found strong evidence of political 
budgetary cycles in Portuguese municipalities. Their analysis reveals that deficits, and 
expenditures, particularly investment, increase significantly in election years and, in 
some cases, in the year before. They also showed that electoral cycles were stronger for 
investment items highly visible to the electorate, for example, construction spending on 
public infra-structure. Given these results, it would also be interesting to investigate: (1) 
if voters reward politicians’ opportunistic spending policies, or punish them, as 
suggested by Peltzman (1992); (2) if the items targeted by mayors’ electoral policies are 
those that generate more votes. Additionally, because democracy was reestablished in 
Portugal in 1974, during our sample period the country has evolved from a “new” to an 
“established” democracy. This makes Portugal an appropriate laboratory for analyzing 
if the determinants of electoral results change as a democracy matures. In the article, we 
also test if the popularity of the national government conditions local electoral results, 
and whether time in office decreases incumbents’ popularity. 
The international literature on vote and popularity functions is already quite 
extensive (Paldam, 2004). However, most of the research concentrates on national 
governments and the Portuguese case is clearly under researched. At the local level, 
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there is only Costa (1998), who analysed the 1989 and 1993 municipal elections. At the 
national level, Veiga and Veiga (2004a), and Veiga and Veiga (2004b) estimate, 
respectively, popularity functions for the four main Portuguese political entities and 
vote intentions functions for the main political parties in the country.  
Use of data for Portuguese municipalities is also motivated by the following 
reasons. First, we have very detailed data on local governments’ financial accounts. 
Second, the mayor is a principal decision-maker in the allocation of resources and the 
distribution of investment in the municipality. Third, the institutional structure of local 
governments and the policy instruments available are the same for all localities, making 
this panel preferable to one composed of several countries. Finally, election dates are 
fixed and defined exogenously from the perspective of the local authorities, and all 
municipalities have elections on the same day. 
 This article is organized as follows. The next section presents some background 
information on Portuguese municipalities. Section 3 describes the data sources and 
section 4 the empirical model. Results are discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 
reports the conclusions. 
 
2. Portuguese municipalities: brief characterization 
This section presents some background information on Portuguese 
municipalities. Democracy was re-established in Portugal by the bloodless military coup 
of April 25, 1974, which put an end to 48 years of dictatorship. Portuguese 
municipalities were formally established in the Constitution of 1976 and the first 
municipal elections took place in December of the same year. Portuguese local 
governments are responsible for improving their populations’ well-being, promoting 
social and economic development, territory organization, and for supplying local public 
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goods (water and sewage, energy, transportation, housing, healthcare, education, 
culture, sports, defence of the environment, and protection of the civilian population).1  
The representative branches of municipalities’ government are the Town 
Council and the Municipal Assembly2. The members of the Town Council are elected 
directly by voters registered in the municipality, who vote for party or independent lists. 
Votes are then transformed into mandates using the Hondt method, and the mayor is the 
first candidate from the list that receives the most votes. Part of the Municipal Assembly 
is elected directly by voters while the remaining members are the presidents of the 
councils of the freguesias that belong to the municipality.3 The Municipal Assembly 
approves the general framework for local policies, while the Town Council, which 
holds the executive power, is responsible for its elaboration and implementation. The 
mayor is the president of the Town Council and has a prominent role in the executive.  
Budgeting rules and institutions are the same for all Portuguese mainland 
municipalities, although the law regulating local public finances changed during the 
period considered.4 Municipalities are financially autonomous. They have their own 
employees and assets, and they define the local budget and the plan of activities without 
a requirement of authorization from a higher-ranked authority. As part of the general 
government sector, local authorities are, however, subject to several control 
mechanisms by central government agencies. These limit their access to revenues as 
well as their expenditure choices. 
It is worth noting that election dates are defined exogenously from the 
perspective of the local authorities and that during our sample period there was no legal 
restriction to the number of terms a mayor could stand for re-election. Since the re-
                                                 
1 Law 159/99 defines the areas of intervention of Portuguese local governments. 
2 Law 169/99 establishes the competencies and the legal framework of municipalities’ branches.  
3 Freguesias are subdivisions of municipalities. They are the lowest administrative unit in Portugal.  
4 Law 1/79, Decree-Law 98/84, Law 1/87 and, currently, Law 42/98. 
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establishment of Democracy in 1974, there were local elections in December of 1976, 
1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001, and in October 2005. 
 
3. Data sources 
The dataset is composed of data on a set of political, financial and economic 
variables for the 278 Portuguese mainland municipalities. Due to the restrictions 
imposed by data availability, the election years covered in this study are 1979, 1982, 
1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001.5 Since this article tries to determine whether or not 
political opportunism of mayors pays off, only the cases in which they run for re-
election are considered. 
Political data, namely election dates and municipal electoral results, were 
obtained from the National Electoral Commission (Comissão Nacional de Eleições) and 
from the Technical Staff for Matters Concerning the Electoral Process (Secretariado 
Técnico dos Assuntos para o Processo Eleitoral) of the Internal Affairs Ministry. The 
government popularity index is based on the monthly surveys published in the 
newspaper Expresso, from 1986 to 2001. 
Data on municipal local accounts and population were obtained from the local 
authority’s (Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais) annual publication called Finanças 
Municipais (Municipal Finances). This report exists from 1979 to 1983 and from 1986 
to 2002. For the two missing years data was obtained directly from the municipalities’ 
official accounts and are incomplete: we have 182 observations for 1984 and 189 for 
1985. Consumer price indexes were taken from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators. 
Data on the total number of employees in firms within each municipality and on their 
average wages, from 1985 to 2000, was obtained from the “Quadros de Pessoal” 
                                                 
5 Although there was also an election in October 2005, data on the municipal financial accounts is only 
available until 2003. The election of 1979 is not covered in several estimations (whenever lags, term 
means or deviations from term means are included). 
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database, of the Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (MTSS).6 Finally, 
data on the Municipal Purchasing Power Index, for the years 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000, 
2002 and 2004 was obtained from the National Statistics Office (INE). 
 
4. Specification of the empirical model 
 The empirical models to be estimated for a panel of 2757 municipalities, over a 
maximum of seven elections, use the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent in 
the current elections, Votes, as the dependent variable. In the set of explanatory 
variables, we start by including the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent in the 
previous balloting, Votes (Previous Election).8 This variable accounts for the support 
the mayor enjoyed at the start of the term and for factors not considered in the other 
explanatory variables, such as the mayor’s personal characteristics, ideology and party 
affiliation of voters, socio-economic characteristics of each municipality, etc.  
The erosion of the mayor’s popularity as he/she stays longer in power is 
accounted for by including a variable, Years President, that counts the number of years 
during which the incumbent has remained in power (a negative estimated coefficient is 
expected for this variable). Mayors’ popularity tends to decrease with time in office 
because the policy actions, even if supported by most of the electorate, will tend to 
alienate some voters, who will then support the opposition (Mueller, 1970, and Frey and 
Schneider, 1978). Voter support may also decay when mayors fail to deliver what they 
promised during the electoral campaigns (Mueller, 1970). 
                                                 
6 The “Quadros de Pessoal” is a yearly mandatory employment survey that covers virtually all privately 
owned firms employing paid labor in Portugal (public servants and own employment are not included). 
Although the most recent year for which data is available is 2003, there is no data on wages for 2001. 
7 For the three municipalities created in 1997 (Odivelas, Trofa and Vizela) there is only election data for 
2001 (the last election in our sample), which means that there is no data for the votes obtained in the 
previous elections. Thus, in the estimations, we have a maximum of 275 municipalities. 
8 It is worth mentioning that Votes (Previous Election) is not always equal to the first lag of Votes. That 
only happens in municipalities in which the mayor was always reelected. In fact, the correlation between 
Votes (Previous Election) and lagged Votes is around 75%. 
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It is also possible that the votes for an incumbent mayor whose political party is 
in charge of the national government are affected by the popularity of the latter. That is, 
the electorate may also wish to reward, or punish, the national government in second 
order elections. Carsey and Wright (1998, p. 995) formulate this possibility in the 
following manner for the United States: 
“For many citizens, political judgements are general indictments or rewards of 
the party in power, usually defined as the presidential party. Thus, we expect 
presidential approval to influence all types of subpresidential voting 
behaviour.”  
We account for this possibility with an interaction variable that consists in 
multiplying the dummy variable Government’s Party (that takes the value of one when 
the mayor’s party is that of the Prime Minister, and equals zero otherwise) by the value 
of the Government Popularity Index in the month of the elections.9 Since a more 
popular government may help the mayors of the same party getting higher percentages 
of votes, a positive coefficient is expected for Government’s Party*Government 
Popularity. One problem with this variable is that it leads to many missing values, as 
the popularity data is only available from 1986 onwards. In order to be able to work 
with data since 1979, another interaction variable was created, which consists in 
multiplying the dummy variable Government’s Party by the national Inflation Rate. 
Since voters tend to punish the national government for bad economic outcomes,10 
higher inflation should lead to lower percentages of votes for the incumbent mayors of 
the government’s party (a negative coefficient is expected for this interaction variable). 
                                                 
9 See Veiga and Veiga (2004a) for the definition of the index and for graphs that illustrate its evolution. 
10 On the responsibility hypothesis and for a survey of the vote/popularity functions literature, see Paldam 
(2004). For evidence on the Portuguese case, at the national level, see Veiga and Veiga (2004a and 
2004b). 
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 The first group of tests of the hypothesis that opportunism pays off use data on 
more aggregated accounts, such as budget balances, taxes and total expenditures. We 
then test the hypothesis using more detailed data. First, we split expenditures into 
current and capital. Second, we estimate models for total investment expenditures (the 
main component of capital expenditures). Finally, its components and sub-components 
are also analysed. This very detailed analysis, that considers all types of investment 
expenditures, allows for the identification of those for which pre-electoral manipulation 
would increase the percentage of votes for the incumbent. That is, we are able to 
identify the types of expenditures that opportunistic mayors should target and to check 
whether or not they correspond to those for which Veiga and Veiga (2004c) found 
evidence of political business cycles. 
Ultimately, votes should be driven by the incumbent’s performance and not 
necessarily by the magnitude or the composition of expenditures. Since there is no data 
on the quality of the services provided by the Portuguese municipalities, we use the few 
measures of municipal economic performance that are available. Thus, the final step of 
the empirical analysis is to control for the evolution of employment,11 wages and 
purchasing power in each municipality. Descriptive statistics for all the variables 
mentioned above are presented in Table 1.12 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 Two empirical models will be estimated in order to check if opportunism pays 
off. In the first, the levels of the variables that may be the object of opportunism in the 
election year and in the two previous years are included along with the political 
variables referred to above. The empirical model can be specified as follows: 
                                                 
11 See Coelho, Veiga and Veiga (forthcoming) for a study of political business cycles in municipal 
employment. 
12 The descriptive statistics for the components and sub-components of investment expenditures were not 
included in order to economize space, but they are available from the authors upon request. 
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 itititiitititelpreviit GPYPVotesVotes ενγφα +++++++= −− 3' 2,2' 1,1'.., βXβXβX
 2001,1997,1993,1989,1985,1982,1979  275,...,1 == ti  (1) 
where Votesit is the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent’s party in the 
election of year t, Votesi,prev.el. is the percentage of votes obtained in the previous 
election, YPit stands for Years President and GPit stands for Government’s 
Party*Inflation Rate or for Government’s Party*Government Popularity, X is a vector 
of variables subject to opportunistic manipulation (their levels in the election year, t; the 
year before elections, t-1; and two years before elections, t-2, are included),13 νi is the 
individual effect of municipality i, εit is the error term, α, φ and γ are parameters and β1, 
β2 and β3 are vectors of parameters to be estimated. Evidence that opportunism pays off 
would be consistent with a positive and statistically significant β1, eventually, a positive 
and statistically significant β2, and a negative or statistically insignificant β3. 
The second model uses the term mean and the percentage deviation of the level 
in the election year relative to the term mean of the variables included in vector X. The 
empirical model can be specified as follows: 
 ititiitititelpreviit GPYPVotesVotes ενγφα ++++++= 2' ,1'.., βXdevβXtm
 2001,1997,1993,1989,1985,1982,1979  275,...,1 == ti  (2) 
where Xtm is a vector of term means of the variables included in X, Xdev is a vector of 
the percentage deviations of their election year values from the term means, and all the 
remaining variables and parameters are defined as in equation (1). Evidence that 
opportunism pays off would be consistent with a positive and statistically significant β2. 
                                                 
13 Since the first terms were only three-years long, when working with the full sample it is not possible to 
include the level of X three years before elections, because in those cases it would be an election year. 
That value will be included when working just with the most recent elections. 
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A positive and statistically significant β1 means that greater average values of the X 
variables over a term are associated with greater percentages of votes. 
 
5. Empirical results 
 The estimation results of the panel data models described in the previous section, 
controlling for municipality fixed effects,14 are shown in Table 2.15 T-statistics are 
presented between parentheses and the degree of statistical significance is signalled with 
asterisks. The number of observations, municipalities and elections, and the adjusted R 
squared are reported at the foot of the table. 
 In column 1 of Table 2, we report the results of the estimation of the model of 
equation (1) for three variables which may be subject to opportunistic manipulation by 
mayors: the municipal Budget Balance, Taxes, and Total Expenditures.16 Although 
Veiga and Veiga (2004c) found evidence of political business cycles in these three 
variables, none of them seems to have a positive and statistically significant effect on 
the votes obtained.17 As expected, Votes (Previous Election) has a positive sign and is 
statistically significant, indicating that there is some persistence in vote shares. There is 
also evidence of popularity erosion over time, as Years President is statistically 
significant with a negative sign. The same result is obtained for Government’s 
                                                 
14 Municipal dummy variables are globally statistically significant, and Hausman tests indicate that a 
fixed effects specification is always preferable to a random effects one. 
15 As explained above, Votes (Previous Election) is not the first lag of Votes (their correlation is around 
75%). Thus, the implementation of the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator for linear 
dynamic panel data models would not be appropriate. Nevertheless, we estimated it just as a robustness 
check, and the results (available upon request) were similar to those presented in this paper.  
16 For each municipality, all fiscal variables were divided by the consumer price index for the base year 
(1995) and, then, by its population. Thus, they are expressed in euros (of 1995) per capita. The budget 
balance, based on public accounting, is calculated according to the methodology of the General Direction 
of the Budget (Direcção Geral do Orçamento) of the Ministry of Finance, which excludes the 
transactions in financial assets and liabilities from the totals of revenues and expenditures. 
17 As indicated in equation (1), we started with the estimation of a model which also included the values 
of the three fiscal variables one and two years before the elections. Then, these lagged values were 
sequentially excluded from the model when they turned out not statistically significant. 
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Party*Inflation Rate, indicating that when inflation is high, mayors that belong to the 
prime minister’s party tend to lose votes. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 The results of the estimation of the model of equation (2) are reported in column 
2. Again, there is no evidence that the manipulation of the Budget Balance or of Taxes 
affects votes. Concerning Total Expenditures, their Term Mean is positive and 
statistically significant, meaning that mayors who have higher average expenditures 
over the term tend to get more votes. But, spending relatively more in the election year 
does not seem to result in higher vote shares, as the % Deviation of the Election Year 
from the Term Mean is not statistically significant. 
 In the estimations of columns 3 and 4, the dummy variable Government’s Party 
was interacted with Government Popularity instead of with the inflation rate. As 
expected, this interaction variable is statistically significant, with a positive sign. Now, 
Total Expenditures in the election year are highly statistically significant (column 3), 
indicating that greater expenditures lead to higher percentages of votes.18 The difference 
of results when comparing to those of column 1 may be explained by the fact that in the 
estimation of column 3 only the last 4 elections are considered, while that of column 1 
considers all 7 elections that took place during the sample period.19  
 In order to study the possibility that opportunism worked better in the most 
recent elections, the sample was split in two: one sub-sample covers the first four 
elections (1979, 1982, 1985 and 1989), while the other covers the last three elections 
(1993, 1997 and 2001). Results of columns 5 and 6 imply that opportunism did not 
                                                 
18 When including the levels of expenditures for the election year and for previous years only the one for 
the election year is statistically significant. When including one at a time, the level for the election year 
has the highest t-ratio. This result confirms the evidence for voter myopia found in the vote/popularity 
functions literature (see Paldam, 2004). 
19 Results for the term average of Total Expenditures may be stronger in column 4 than in column 2 for 
the same reason. 
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work in the period 1979-1989, as the fiscal variables are never statistically significant.20 
In the period 1990-2001, the opportunistic manipulation of Total Expenditures seems to 
have worked well. Expenditures in the election year are positively related to votes 
(columns 7 and 9), with 90 to 100 euros per capita of additional expenditures resulting 
in an increase of one percentage point in the vote share. In columns 8 and 10, both the 
term mean expenditures and the percentage deviation of election year expenditures from 
the term mean are positive and statistically significant. This implies that for a mayor it 
is both worthwhile to spend more on average over the term, and to increase 
expenditures in the election year relative to the previous years of the same electoral 
cycle.21 
 The fact that opportunism paid off better in the most recent Portuguese 
municipal elections contradicts the results of Brender and Drazen (2005) that indicate 
that political business cycles tend to work in new democracies but not in established 
ones. That is, our results imply that they worked better as the Portuguese democracy 
became more established (1990-2001) than in the first elections after the restoration of 
democracy in 1974. A possible explanation for this result is that, as democracy matured, 
not only voters learned about the democratic system; politicians may also have acquired 
more knowledge on how to implement electoral politics. It is worth mentioning that 
according to Alt and Lassen (2006), conditioning on the degree of fiscal policy 
transparency, electoral cycles also exist in advanced industrialized economies. 
Therefore, in line with Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) models of rational 
opportunistic budget cycles, our result suggest that, even in the latter years of 
                                                 
20 Since the data on the government’s popularity only starts in 1986, it is not possible to include it in the 
estimations for the period 1979-1989. 
21 Concerning political variables, results are similar across the sub-samples, except for Government’s 
Party*Inflation Rate, which has a positive sign in 1993-2001, and is marginally statistically significant. 
That change in the sign may be due to the fact that inflation was no longer a major economic problem by 
the time of the elections of 1997 and 2001, as it reached low levels comparable to those of the other EU 
members. 
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democracy, there is asymmetry of information between voters and politicians, that the 
latter explore by manipulating budgetary items in order to increase their chances of 
reelection. 
 The next step of the analysis was to determine which type of expenditures 
produced greater effects on votes. For that purpose, Current and Capital Expenditures 
were considered in the models of Table 3. It is worth mentioning that, when considering 
more than on type of expenditures, opportunism can take two forms: increased 
expenditures in the election year; and, strategic changes in the composition of 
expenditures favouring the type(s) most preferred by the electorate.22 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The coefficients associated with Current Expenditures are generally not 
statistically significant, which means that its opportunistic manipulation does not tend to 
increase votes (the exceptions are columns 3 and 10). Results for Capital Expenditures 
are similar to those obtained for Total Expenditures in Table 2. The main difference is 
that expenditures in the Election Year and in the Year Before Election are also 
significant in column 1. Thus, there is evidence that higher Capital Expenditures prior to 
elections help gaining votes and that it also would pay off to strategically shift funds 
from Current to Capital Expenditures.23 
Since Investment Expenditures account on average for almost 90% of Capital 
Expenditures, and are their most visible component to voters, it is likely that this is the 
type of expenditures that has greater impact on votes. In fact, results for Investment 
Expenditures, presented in Table 4, are stronger than those for Capital Expenditures 
shown in Table 3: t-statistics are generally higher, the % Deviation of the Election Year 
                                                 
22 See Drazen and Eslava (2005) for a theoretical model on opportunism via expenditure composition. 
23 A similar result was obtained by Drazen and Eslava (2005) for Colombian municipalities. A result 
indicating that it may be worth increasing expenditures of both types is that of column 3. 
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from the Term Mean is now also statistically significant for the full sample (column 2), 
and the expenditures in the Election Year are marginally significant in the period 1979-
1989 (column 5). These stronger effects of Investment Expenditures on votes are 
consistent with the results of Veiga and Veiga (2004c), who found evidence of greater 
political business cycles in that type of expenditures than in the other fiscal items 
analysed.24 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
In the estimations of Table 5, investment expenditures are broken up into their 
seven components. In column 1, only Other Buildings and Miscellaneous Constructions 
are statistically significant. These results, confirmed in column 3 where only these two 
components are considered, were somewhat expected, as these are the most important 
and most visible components of Investment Expenditures. Although estimation results 
shown in column 2 only present evidence that opportunism pays off for Other 
Buildings, and eventually for Other Investments, those of column 4 show that is also 
worthwhile to spend more on average in Miscellaneous Constructions. Thus, an 
opportunistic mayor can gain votes by strategically shifting funds from the five 
components of Investment Expenditures that are not statistically significant into Other 
Buildings and/or Miscellaneous Constructions.25 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 Since we have very detailed data on the municipal accounts, we are able to 
disaggregate Investment Expenditures even further, in order to analyse the three 
components of Other Buildings and the six components of Miscellaneous 
                                                 
24 Using data only for the municipal elections of 1989 and 1993, Costa (1998) found out that investment 
expenditures had a positive effect on votes, while current expenditures, such as disbursements to 
compensation of employees, seemed to have no effects. 
25 In order to economize space, only the results obtained when using Government’s Party*Inflation Rate 
(the one for which the number of observations is higher) are shown in Tables 5 and 6. Results when using 
Government’s Party*Government Popularity are very similar (they are available upon request) 
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Constructions. The results of the estimation of the model of equation (1) for these nine 
sub-components of Investment Expenditures are shown in column 1 of Table 6. These 
indicate that votes can be gained by increasing expenditures in the election year (or in 
the year before, in some cases) in Social Equipment, Other, Overpasses, streets and 
complementary works, and in Rural roads. In columns 2 and 3, where only the 
components of Other Buildings are considered, evidence that opportunism pays off is 
confirmed for Social Equipment and Other. Finally, the results of column 4, for a model 
including only the components of Miscellaneous Constructions, confirm that higher 
expenditures in Overpasses, streets and complementary works (in the year before 
election) and in Rural roads (in the election year) tend to result in higher percentages of 
votes for the incumbent.26  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
These results are consistent with those of Veiga and Veiga (2004c), who found 
that the sub-components Other, Overpasses, streets and complementary works and 
Rural roads were those for which there was greater evidence of opportunism by 
mayors. They also found evidence of strategic expenditure switching among sub-
components of Investment Expenditures. That is, close to elections, mayors reduce 
expenditures on some items in order to be able to spend more on those most favoured 
by the electorate. 
 The last step of the empirical analysis was to include variables accounting for 
the economic performance of municipalities. In columns 1 and 2 of Table 7, municipal 
Employment and average Wages (which can be used as a proxy for income)27 were 
included alongside with Investment Expenditures. Results for the latter are very similar 
                                                 
26 Since some investment expenditures take time to produce results visible to the population, in some 
cases it is the investment made in the year before the election that has greater effects on votes. 
27 Since data on Wages are not available for 2001, wages in 2000 were used for the 2001 elections. 
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to those obtained in Table 4. While Employment does not seem to affect votes, higher 
Wages in the election year (column 1) and higher mean wages over the term (column 2) 
lead to greater percentages of votes for the incumbent.28 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Finally, the INE’s municipal Purchasing Power Index (PPI) was included in the 
estimations of columns 3 and 4. This Index is constructed in a way that takes into 
account over 20 variables that reflect the purchasing power of each municipality. It 
measures a municipality’s purchasing power relative to the country average, which 
equals 100. Thus, increasing values of the PPI over time for a municipality mean that its 
purchasing power is increasing relative to the country average. Although the value of 
the Index in the election year is not statistically significant, its % Variation over the 
Term is positive and marginally statistically significant in column 4. Thus, there is weak 
evidence that the growth over a four-year term of a municipality’s purchasing power 
relative to the country average leads to a higher percentage of votes obtained by the 
incumbent mayor.29 
 
6. Conclusions 
 Using a very detailed and unexplored dataset covering 275 Portuguese 
municipalities, during the seven local elections that occurred from 1979 to 2001, we 
present clear evidence that the opportunism of mayors (documented in Veiga and Veiga, 
2004c) pays off. Results show that higher investment expenditures in election years lead 
to higher vote percentages for incumbent mayors in Portuguese municipalities. This is 
                                                 
28 Since data for unemployment and wages starts in 1985 and that on the purchasing power index starts 
only in 1993, the use of the variable Government’s Party*Government Popularity does no longer imply 
the loss of a great number of observations. Thus, in Table 7 we report the results obtained when using this 
variable. Similar results are obtained when using Government’s Party*Inflation Rate. 
29 Since there is data for the PPI only in the years of 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002 and 2004, it is not 
possible to compute term means or % deviations of the levels in election years relative to term means. 
Furthermore, the PPI in 2000 was used for the 2001 elections. 
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especially true for investment expenditures, for which there is clear evidence that 
increases in the election year, relative to the term average, also lead to higher 
percentages of votes for the incumbent. These results are robust to the inclusion of 
economic performance indicators, such as employment, wages and a purchasing power 
index. They are in line with the evidence presented by Akhmedov and Zhuravkaya 
(2004) for Russian regions. 
Concerning the political variables, our results are consistent with popularity 
erosion over time spent in office, with the hypothesis that the popularity of the national 
government affects the votes obtained by incumbent mayors of the same party, and with 
the view that the party holding the national government may also be subject to 
evaluation by voters in second order (municipal, in the present case) elections. 
 When checking if opportunism by mayors has always led to more votes for the 
incumbent, we found out that it had little or no effects in the elections of 1979 to 1989. 
But, results for the last three elections in our sample (1993, 1997, and 2001) were 
stronger than for the entire sample, showing that it was in this period that opportunism 
paid off better. The fact that opportunistic spending was more vote-productive after 
Portugal became an established democracy than it had been when democracy was newly 
established contradicts Brender and Drazen (2005), who concluded that political budget 
cycles happen in new but not in established democracies. This may be a result of a lack 
of transparency regarding local fiscal policies combined with the acquisition of 
knowledge by politicians, as democracy matured. 
Electoral manipulation can also be accomplished by altering the composition of 
expenditures. As in Drazen and Eslava (2005), results indicate that capital expenditures 
increase votes while current expenditures have little or no effects. Thus, opportunistic 
mayors can gain votes by strategically shifting funds from current to capital 
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expenditures (especially to investment) shortly before elections. Using detailed data on 
the municipal fiscal accounts, we show that the types of investment expenditures that 
they should target are: Social Equipment; Other; Overpasses, streets and 
complementary works; and, Rural roads. If increasing total expenditures or shifting 
funds from current expenditures is not possible, mayors can gain votes by spending 
more on these items at the expense of other types of investment expenditures less 
favoured by the electorate. It is also worth noting that, with the exception of Social 
Equipment, these components of investment expenditures are the ones for which Veiga 
and Veiga (2004c) found greater evidence of political business cycles. Thus, it seems 
that Portuguese mayors have been manipulating expenditures in a way that increases 
their chances of re-election. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Observ. Mean StandardDeviation Minimum Maximum
Votes 1348 49.70 11.98 8.65 92.18
Votes (Previous Election) 1434 50.40 9.78 26.98 91.74
Years President 1432 7.13 4.50 3.00 25.00
Government’s Party 1430 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Government Popularity Index 883 43.00 6.82 33.50 52.50
Inflation Rate 1434 12.41 8.08 2.33 23.66
Budget Balance (Election year) 1366 -22.63 55.98 -522.12 442.15
Term Mean 1278 -16.03 34.97 -415.40 163.48
% Deviation of Election Year from the Term Mean 1212 204.81 6192.99 -33367.48 208627.10
Taxes (Election year) 1358 43.41 57.83 0.00 565.54
Term Mean 1278 41.45 53.20 0.00 505.73
% Deviation of Election Year from the Term Mean 1204 8.07 22.66 -100.00 148.81
Total Expenditures (Election year) 1366 388.39 259.10 12.17 2196.64
Term Mean 1278 355.96 210.41 74.43 1552.56
% Deviation of Election Year from the Term Mean 1212 11.73 16.85 -71.89 121.24
Current Expenditures (Election year) 1364 176.13 131.94 7.07 1049.77
Term Mean 1278 167.41 115.10 22.30 905.84
% Deviation of Election Year from the Term Mean 1210 11.26 11.80 -76.67 71.69
Capital expenditures (Election year) 1366 212.52 153.03 5.11 1225.84
Year before election 1202 198.02 129.28 14.03 1189.34
Term Mean 1278 188.69 118.11 19.30 1144.61
% Deviation of Election Year from the Term Mean 1212 13.49 28.03 -76.21 155.36
Investment expenditures (Election year) 1335 189.95 139.27 5.04 1191.93
Year before election 1176 174.45 115.18 10.25 857.20
Term Mean 1278 166.22 106.59 14.13 944.52
% Deviation of Election Year from the Term Mean 1181 14.68 30.34 -88.55 169.34
Total Employment (% population) – Election year 1096 14.81 9.97 1.04 89.73
Term Mean 883 14.90 9.68 1.18 85.16
% Deviation of Election Year from the Term Mean 883 8.31 11.49 -41.00 82.67
Wages (Election year) 1096 452.67 99.46 256.62 1005.31
Term Mean 883 467.03 92.56 281.11 971.16
% Deviation of Election Year from the Term Mean 883 1.11 4.33 -21.69 16.55
Purchasing Power Index (Election year) 657 64.44 31.51 18.88 305.19
% Variation Over the Term 443 8.38 16.77 -46.37 102.77
Sources: DGAL, OECD, MTSS, STAPE and municipal official accounts. 
Note:  The budget balance, taxes, expenditures and wages are expressed in euros per capita (at 1995 prices). 
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Table 2: Budget Balance, Taxes and Total Expenditures 
 Full Sample (All Available Observations) 1979 - 1989 1993-2001 (Last Three Elections) 
Votes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Votes (Previous Election) .460 
(12.2)*** 
.463 
(11.4)*** 
.155 
(2.79)*** 
.154 
(2.75)*** 
.457 
(7.12)*** 
.498 
(5.83)*** 
.215 
(3.04)*** 
.196 
(2.75)*** 
.209 
(3.01)*** 
.191 
(2.71)*** 
Years President -.850 
(-10.8)*** 
-.853 
(-10.6)*** 
-.820 
(-8.60)*** 
-.817 
(-8.53)*** 
-1.800 
(-9.70)*** 
-1.939 
(-7.65)*** 
-.798 
(-6.90)*** 
-.797 
(-6.92)*** 
-.787 
(-6.89)*** 
-.790 
(-6.93)*** 
Government’s Party * 
Inflation Rate 
-.260 
(-6.62)*** 
-.196 
(-4.17)*** 
  -.292 
(-5.62)*** 
-.225 
(-3.16)*** 
.291 
(1.67)* 
.339 
(1.94)* 
  
Government’s Party * 
Government Popularity 
  .040 
(2.31)** 
.041 
(2.38)** 
    .072 
(3.46)*** 
.072 
(3.47)*** 
Budget Balance: 
Election Year 
-.004 
(-.74) 
 .004 
(.56) 
 .015 
(1.11) 
 -.002 
(-.26) 
 -.002 
(-.22) 
 
Term Mean  -.002 (-.15) 
 .010 
(.82) 
 .031 
(.90) 
 .008 
(.62) 
 .006 
(.48) 
% Deviation of Election 
Year from the Term Mean 
 -.00004 
(-.79) 
 -.000001 
(-.03) 
 -.0002 
(-.69) 
 .00006 
(1.02) 
 .0001 
(1.04) 
Taxes: 
Election Year 
.002 
(.22) 
 .014 
(1.02) 
 .027 
(1.10) 
 -.002 
(-.14) 
 -.001 
(-.08) 
 
Term Mean  -.0004 (-.03) 
 -.0001 
(-.004) 
 .082 
(1.62) 
 -.017 
(-.91) 
 -.015 
(-.85) 
% Deviation of Election 
Year from the Term Mean 
 -.013 
(-.89) 
 .013 
(.67) 
 -.003 
(-.12) 
 .032 
(1.12) 
 .027 
(.95) 
Total Expenditures: 
Election Year 
.002 
(1.11) 
 .012 
(4.62)*** 
 .005 
(.51) 
 .010 
(2.78)*** 
 .011 
(2.98)*** 
 
Term Mean  .005 (1.84)* 
 .017 
(5.03)*** 
 -.019 
(-1.20) 
 .015 
(3.13)*** 
 .016 
(3.29)*** 
% Deviation of Election 
Year from the Term Mean 
 .020 
(1.02) 
 .030 
(1.25) 
 -.008 
(-.18) 
 .068 
(2.35)** 
 .063 
(2.22)** 
# Observations 1270 1159 839 839 620 509 650 650 650 650 
# Municipalities 275 275 275 275 264 262 274 274 274 274 
# Elections 7 6 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
Adjusted R2 .35 .36 .35 .35 38 .36 .39 .40 .41 .41 
Notes: Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects. Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by 
the incumbent. Models estimated with a constant. T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level at which 
the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
 22
Table 3: Current and Capital Expenditures  
 Full Sample (All Available Observations) 1979-1989 1993-2001 (Last Three Elections) 
Votes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Votes (Previous Election) .425 
(10.4)*** 
.429 
(10.6)*** 
.157 
(2.83)*** 
.155 
(2.80)*** 
.430 
(6.70)*** 
.434 
(5.08)*** 
.213 
(3.04)*** 
.209 
(2.97)*** 
.209 
(3.02)*** 
.202 
(2.92)*** 
Years President -.826 
(-10.4)*** 
-.832 
(-10.5)*** 
-.803 
(-8.42)*** 
-.831 
(-8.72)*** 
-1.612 
(-6.96)*** 
-1.559 
(-5.34)*** 
-.801 
(-6.95)*** 
-.813 
(-7.04)*** 
-.790 
(-6.94)*** 
-.806 
(-7.07)*** 
Government’s Party * 
Inflation Rate 
-.201 
(-4.36)*** 
-.209 
(-4.55)*** 
  -.305 
(-5.85)*** 
-.243 
(-3.44)*** 
.296 
(1.71)* 
.315 
(1.81)* 
  
Government’s Party * 
Government Popularity 
  .044 
(2.50)** 
.042 
(2.39)** 
    .072 
(3.50)*** 
.074 
(3.61)*** 
Current Expenditures:           
Election Year -.005 
(-1.31) 
 .012 
(2.16)** 
 -.010 
(-.58) 
 .009 
(1.30) 
 .009 
(1.37) 
 
Term Mean  -.009 
(-1.97)** 
 .008 
(1.17) 
 -.036 
(-1.53) 
 .003 
(.31) 
 .002 
(.21) 
% Deviation of Election 
Year from the Term Mean 
 .003 
(.13) 
 -.028 
(-.69) 
 .011 
(.24) 
 .088 
(1.62) 
 .092 
(1.71)* 
Capital Expenditures:           
Election Year .007 
(1.88)* 
 .007 
(1.79)* 
 .012 
(1.51) 
 .011 
(2.50)** 
 .012 
(2.71)*** 
 
Year Before Election .008 
(1.95)* 
 .009 
(2.04)** 
       
Term Mean  .019 
(4.30)*** 
 .021 
(3.67)*** 
 .003 
(.26) 
 .018 
(2.65)*** 
 .020 
(3.05)*** 
% Deviation of Election 
Year from the Term Mean 
 .010 
(.87) 
 .023 
(1.66)* 
 .007 
(.26) 
 .028 
(1.71)* 
 .023 
(1.47) 
# Observations 1155 1165 836 839 626 515 650 650 650 649 
# Municipalities 275 275 275 275 266 264 274 274 274 274 
# Elections 6 6 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
Adjusted R2 .37 .37 .35 .35 .37 .36 .39 .40 .41 .41 
Notes: Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects. Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by the 
incumbent. Models estimated with a constant. T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 4: Investment Expenditures  
 Full Sample (All Available Observations) 1979-1989 1993-2001 (Last Three Elections) 
Votes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Votes (Previous Election) .447 
(10.9)*** 
.459 
(11.2)*** 
.166 
(2.98)*** 
.159 
(2.85)*** 
.445 
(6.71)*** 
.486 
(5.27)*** 
.237 
(3.42)*** 
.227 
(3.26)*** 
.233 
(3.41)*** 
.220 
(3.18)*** 
Years President -.836 
(-10.7)*** 
-.850 
(-10.9)*** 
-.785 
(-8.18)*** 
-.813 
(-8.52)*** 
-1.664 
(-9.22)*** 
-1.672 
(-6.54)*** 
-.784 
(-6.79)*** 
-.789 
(-6.83)*** 
-.772 
(-6.77)*** 
-.782 
(-6.85)*** 
Government’s Party * 
Inflation Rate 
-.172 
(-3.75)*** 
-.173 
(-3.81)*** 
  -.279 
(-5.23)*** 
-.206 
(-2.70)*** 
.258 
(1.50) 
.282 
(1.62) 
  
Government’s Party * 
Government Popularity 
  .043 
(2.43)** 
.042 
(2.39)** 
    .068 
(3.31)*** 
.070 
(3.37)*** 
Investment Expenditures           
Election Year .008 
(2.01)** 
 .011 
(2.69)*** 
 .014 
(1.73)* 
 .012 
(2.95)*** 
 .013 
(3.21)*** 
 
Year Before Election .007 
(1.54) 
 .012 
(2.27)** 
       
Term Mean  .017 
(3.88)*** 
 .029 
(5.61)*** 
 .005 
(.34) 
 .018 
(2.80)*** 
 .020 
(3.21)*** 
% Deviation of Election 
Year from the Term Mean 
 .018 
(1.71)* 
 .023 
(1.83)* 
 .017 
(.63) 
 .033 
(2.34)** 
 .029 
(2.12)** 
# Observations 1128 1136 836 839 597 486 650 649 650 650 
# Municipalities 275 275 275 275 261 259 274 274 274 274 
# Elections 6 6 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 
Adjusted R2 .37 .37 .34 .35 .36 .33 .39 .39 .40 .41 
Notes: - Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects; 
- Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent; 
- Models estimated with a constant; 
- T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis; 
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 5: Components of Investment Expenditures  
Votes 1 2 3 4 
Votes (Previous Election) .335 
(6.42)*** 
.363 
(4.62)*** 
.334 
(6.52)*** 
.344 
(6.72)*** 
Years President -.887 
(-9.72)*** 
-.810 
(-5.59)*** 
-.863 
(-9.61)*** 
-.886 
(-9.80)*** 
Government’s Party * Inflation Rate -.146 
(-2.05)** 
-.055 
(-.48) 
-.182 
(-2.67)*** 
-.179 
(-2.63)*** 
Acquisition of Land: 
Election Year 
.025 
(.74) 
   
Term Mean  .120 (1.17) 
  
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .004 
(.72) 
  
Housing: 
Election Year 
.017 
(1.07) 
   
Term Mean  -.031 (-.83) 
  
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .002 
(.49) 
  
Other Buildings: 
Year Before Election 
.039 
(2.95)*** 
 .041 
(3.19)*** 
 
Term Mean  .083 (3.00)*** 
 .041 
(2.44)** 
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .022 
(1.78)* 
 .010 
(1.91)* 
Miscellaneous Constructions: 
Election Year 
.011 
(2.46)** 
 .013 
(3.21)*** 
 
Term Mean  -.005 (-.53) 
 .019 
(3.00)*** 
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .004 
(.23) 
 .005 
(.51) 
Transportation Material: 
Election Year 
.098 
(1.39) 
   
Term Mean  .037 (.21) 
  
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .001 
(.12) 
  
Machinery and Equipment: 
Election Year 
.036 
(.75) 
   
Term Mean  .134 (1.35) 
  
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .001 
(.05) 
  
Other Investments: 
Election Year 
.021 
(.53) 
   
Term Mean  -.051 (-.46) 
  
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .008 
(1.67)* 
  
# Observations 934 520 944 954 
# Municipalities 275 231 275 275 
# Elections 5 5 5 5 
Adjusted R2 .32 .33 .33 .33 
Notes:  Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects. Votes, the 
dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by the incumbent. Models 
estimated with a constant. T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in 
parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 6: Components of Other Buildings and of Miscellaneous Constructions 
Votes 1 2 3 4 
Votes (Previous Election) .298 
(5.67)*** 
.631 
(7.25)*** 
.424 
(5.31)*** 
.332 
(6.35)*** 
Years President -.889 
(-9.71)*** 
-.853 
(-9.51)*** 
-.703 
(-4.81)*** 
-.865 
(-9.40)*** 
Government’s Party * Inflation Rate -.185 
(-2.64)*** 
-.231 
(-3.79)*** 
-.224 
(-1.77)* 
-.197 
(-2.81)*** 
Sports, recreational and schooling 
facilities: 
    
Election Year .003 (.22) 
.003 
(.02) 
  
Term Mean   .044 (1.13) 
 
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
  .005 
(.95) 
 
Social equipment:     
Election Year .105 (1.97)** 
.116 
(2.24)** 
  
Term Mean   -.020 (-.18) 
 
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
  .007 
(1.74)* 
 
Other:     
Year Before Election .056 (3.12)*** 
.048 
(2.78)*** 
  
Term Mean   .086 (2.41)** 
 
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
  .015 
(1.66)* 
 
Overpasses, streets and complementary 
works - Year Before Election 
.030 
(2.12)** 
  .041 
(2.94)*** 
Sewage  
Election Year 
-.023 
(-1.05) 
  -.016 
(-.74) 
Water treatment and distribution  
Election Year 
-.030 
(-1.84)* 
  -.026 
(-1.63) 
Rural Roads 
Election Year 
.019 
(2.44)** 
  .021 
(2.60)*** 
Infrastructures for solid waste treatment  
Election Year 
.047 
(1.11) 
  .041 
(.96) 
Other Miscellaneous Constructions  
Election Year 
.002 
(.33) 
  .007 
(.87) 
# Observations 930 977 544 932 
# Municipalities 275 275 252 275 
# Elections 5 6 5 5 
Adjusted R2 .33 .31 .27 .32 
Notes: - Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects; 
- Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by the 
incumbent. Models estimated with a constant; 
- T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance 
level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 7: Investment Expenditures, Employment, Wages and Purchasing Power 
Votes 1 2 3 4 
Votes (Previous Election) .149 
(2.69)*** 
.148 
(2.66)*** 
.229 
(3.34)*** 
-.069 
(-.78) 
Years President -.837 
(-8.80)*** 
-.842 
(-8.84)*** 
-.783 
(-6.80)*** 
-1.166 
(-6.10)*** 
Government’s Party * Government 
Popularity 
.034 
(1.95)* 
.036 
(2.04)** 
.068 
(3.27)*** 
.068 
(2.95)*** 
Investment Expenditures:     
Election Year .012 (3.27)*** 
 .013 
(3.00)*** 
 
Term Mean  .018 (3.14)*** 
 .028 
(3.53)*** 
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .026 
(2.07)** 
 .013 
(.76) 
Employment     
Election Year .124 (1.12) 
   
Term Mean  .093 (.72) 
  
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .011 
(.34) 
  
Wages:     
Election Year .026 (3.29)*** 
   
Term Mean  .027 (2.96)*** 
  
% Deviation of Election Year from the 
Term Mean 
 .076 
(.83) 
  
Purchasing Power Index:     
Election Year   .042 (.72) 
 
% Variation over the Term    .057 (1.79)* 
# Observations 839 839 650 438 
# Municipalities 275 275 274 265 
# Elections 4 4 3 2 
Adjusted R2 .36 .36 .40 .57 
Notes: - Panel regressions, for election years, controlling for municipality fixed effects; 
- Votes, the dependent variable, was defined as the percentage of votes obtained by the 
incumbent; 
- Models estimated with a constant; 
- T-statistics based on heteroskedastic consistent standard errors are in parenthesis;  
- Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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